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INTRODUCTION
In  the  normal  course  of  trade  sometimes  products  from  specific  countries  are 
considered to be traded unfairly. This paper will focus on a real case where dumping 
was pleaded and antidumping measures were implemented. The aim is to examine a 
decision made by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal in the case of “Certain 
structural tubing originating in or exported from the Republic of Korea, The Republic 
of South Africa and the Republic of Turkey”1.
This paper debates the arguments set out by the Tribunal to establish a connection 
between  dumping  and  the  injury  suffered  by  the  Canadian  market  of  structural 
tubing.  Also, an analysis in certain aspects of the industry that might have caused 
losses even in the absence of competition will be presented. The methodology used 
for this regard is basically the use of comparison of elements such as market size. 
Finally, it will be proven that dumping was not the cause of the injury during the 
period of concern. 
Other  articles  have been written about  injury  measurement  in  cases  of  dumping. 
Grossman2 (1986) suggests a methodology for conducting the analysis to determine 
whether imports were the most significant cause of injury to the U.S. steel industry 
during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. He estimates a reduced-form equation for 
steel industry employment. The resulting estimated coefficients are used to perform 
counter  factual  simulations,  which  allow  us  to  attribute  changes  in  industry 
employment to their proximate causes. The problem with Grossman’s methodology is 
that it assumes that the supply of imports is infinitely price elastic, an assumption 
that is extreme and unrealistic. 
1 Inquiry No. NQ-2003-001
2 Grossman, Gene M."Imports as a Cause of Injury: The Case of the U.S. Steel Industry," Journal of 
International Economics, Vol. 20, No. 3/4, pp.201-22 4, May 1986.
Pindyck and Rottemberg3 (1987) also worked on injury measurement. Their paper sets 
forth a straightforward economic and statistical  framework for  use in  Section 201 
cases4.  This  framework  is  based  on  the  fact  that  if  the  domestic  industry  is 
competitive, injury can arise from one or more of three broad sources: adverse shifts 
in market demand, adverse shifts in domestic supply, or increased imports. Pindyck 
and Rottemberg show how these sources of injury can be distinguished in theory, and 
statistically  evaluated  in  practice.  They  apply  the  framework  to  the  case  of  the 
copper industry.
The problem arises when industries and their workers find themselves overwhelmed 
by rapidly increasing imports which may flow from a number of factors having nothing 
to do with international price discrimination5, they can seek temporary relief that 
would  restrain  and  limit  competition.  Shortly  speaking,  the  problem  is  that 
antidumping protection can be “abused” to shelter uncompetitive domestic industries 
from more efficient rather than “unfair” foreign importers (Shin 1998)6.
Konings and Vandenbusshe (2008)7 using first level panel data, estimate the effect of 
antidumping  duties  on  the  productivity  of  domestic  firms  in  import-competing 
industries. Two key results emerge from their analysis. First, while the productivity of 
the average firm is  moderately improved during antidumping protection, it  always 
remains below the productivity of firms never involved in antidumping cases. The gap 
is  never  closed  between  protected  and  non  protected  firms.  Second,  when  firm 
heterogeneity is introduced they find that domestic firms with relatively low initial 
3 Pindyck, Robert S. and Julio J. Rotemberg. "Are Imports to Blame?: Attribution of Injury Under the 
1974 Trade Act," Journal of Law and Economics, April 1987.
4 It is a section of the United States Trade Act of 1974. If a domestic industry is either seriously injured 
or threatened with increased imports a substantial  cause of  the injury, the law calls  for the U.S. 
International Trade Commission to recommend to the President relief designed to prevent or remedy 
the injury and assist the industry in adjusting to import conditions.
5 Price discrimination is a strategy to capture more surplus from consumers than is obtainable with 
linear uniform
pricing
6 H. J. Shin (1998),”Possible Instances of Predatory Pricing in Recent US Antidumping cases” in R. 
Lawrence (ed.), Brookings Trade Forum 1998, Brookings Institute Press, pp. 81-88.
7 J. Konings and H. Vandenbussche (2008),”Heterogeneous Responses of Firms to Trade Protection”, 
Journal of International Economics, forthcoming. CEPR Discussion Paper 6724
productivity have productivity gains during antidumping protection, while firms with 
high initial productivity experience productivity losses. 
At  the  end  of  the  paper,  it  will  be  analyzed  whether  the  implementation  of 
antidumping duties is welfare improving.
The current study is divided in four parts, a definition of concepts which is essential 
to  clarify  the  terms  and  to  present  the  terminology  to  the  reader,  then  a  case 
summary to have a global understanding of the situation, followed by an explanation 
on how the Tribunal measured the injury and the arguments it gave; finally, I will 
present my investigation which seeks to prove that factors other than dumping caused 
the injury suffered by the Canadian industry. 
DEFINITON OF CONCEPTS
As  we  shall  see  further  on,  one  of  the  mayor  challenges  for  the  accurate 
determination  of  dumping  is  to  have  well  defined  concepts.  This  is  fundamental 
because  some  terms  have  wide  interpretations  that  could  result  in  misleading 
conclusions. 
In order to have a broader understanding and clarity of the subject, definitions of the 
main concepts will be provided hereafter.
Dumping 
Dumping as defined in GATT8 occurs when:
“(…) products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at 
less than the normal value of the products,” in the exporting country.
8 See General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Article VI. October 30, 1947.
Dumping is conceived as price discrimination which by definition occurs when a firm 
sells identical products for different prices in different markets. When this practice 
takes place internationally it is called dumping if the lower price is charged in the 
export market. Nevertheless, dumping can be viewed as well as below-cost sales. This 
is also hard to analyze because it could be caused by market conditions or reasons 
other  than  harming  the  export  market.  In  the  practice,  both  concepts  (price 
discrimination and below-cost sales) are taken into account. 
Under  the  WTO  dumping  may  give  rise  to  antidumping  measures  if  it  causes  or 
threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting 
party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry. The concept of 
injury will be deeper treated further on. 
Normal value and margin of dumping. 
Normal value is defined by the World Trade Organization as the comparable price for 
an import, in the ordinary course of trade, when destined for domestic consumption 
in the exporting country9. “A product is to be considered as being introduced into the 
commerce of an importing country at less than its normal value, if the price of the 
product exported from one country to another
(a)        is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for 
the  like  product  when  destined  for  consumption  in  the  exporting 
country, or, 
(b)        in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either
(i)         the highest comparable price for the like product for export to 
any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or 
9 United States Department of Agriculture.  Glossary. 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/GlobalFoodMarkets/glossary.htm
(ii)        the cost of production of the product in the country of origin 
plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and profit.”10
The margin of dumping is computed by subtracting “Export sales price” from “Home 
market sales price11” and divided by “Export sales price”12. If the margin is greater 
than zero then there is dumping in the conventional sense. Its importance lies in the 
fact that “in order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting party may levy on any 
dumped product  an  anti-dumping duty not  greater  in  amount  than the margin  of 
dumping in respect of such product”13
Material injury
The definition of this concept is essential because it justifies the execution of legal 
sanctions  that otherwise would  not  be legal.  In  strict  sense,  the Code14 does  not 
define the term but it is widely understood as “injury widespread in the industry”15 
and “seriously negative evolution of at least one of the main factors considered in the 
injury”16.
 
In order to implement antidumping duties17, it must be proven that dumping “…causes 
or threatens material injury… or materially retards the establishment of a domestic 
industry18”. Briefly,  to allow antidumping duties there must be four components19: 
first, there must be injury; second, the injury has to be material; third, the injury 
10 See General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Article VI. October 30, 1947.
11 This is in other words, normal value.
12 ( Export sales price – Home market sales)/ Export sales price = Margin of dumping (%)
13 See General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Article VI. October 30, 1947. 
14 Read as 1979 Anti dumping Code that resulted from The Tokyo Round (1973-1979).
15 Angelos PANGRATIS and Edwin VERMULST, Injury in Anti-Dumping procedures, in http://www.vvgb-
law.com/publications/Edwin%20Vermulst/Injury%20in%20Anti-Dumping%20Proceedings.pdf
16 Ibid.
17 Seek to offset injurious dumping. They usually charge extra import duty on the specific product from 
the specific exporting country in order to bring its price closer to normal value or to remove the injury 
to domestic industry in the importing country.
18 Described,  in  part,  as "the domestic  producers as a whole of  the like goods or  those domestic 
producers whose collective production of the like goods constitutes a major proportion of the total 
domestic production of the like goods".
19 Angelos PANGRATIS and Edwin VERMULST, Injury in Anti-Dumping procedures
must also be a result from the dumping and not from any other causes and finally the 
national industry must be injured. 
 
Since there is no precise definition for “material injury”, to prove that the injury is 
material, Authorities should evaluate the effect of dumped imports in the industry20, 
this  means the volume of  dumped imports  on domestic prices  and the volume of 
dumped imports. They also may assess all the economic factors that influence the 
industry such as actual and potential decrease of input, sales, profits, productivity, 
employment, wages, development, and market share, among other aspects. 
Once  it  is  demonstrated  that  the  injury  was  not  caused  by  factors  other  than 
dumping, a connection between the injury suffered by the industry and the dumped 
imports should be established. If  there is  no relation between injury and dumped 
imports then process initiated by the Tribunal is over. In case the damage can be 
explained by dumping, it is important to determine its contribution to material injury 
which  should  not  be  negligible21 in  order  to  proceed  to  formally  implement 
antidumping duties or other measures. 
The  Code  does  not  set  standard  procedures  to  establish  any  of  the  formerly 
mentioned causalities.  Hence, the importance of well defined concepts is that they 
will lead to satisfactory results. Regardless of the methodology used, it is up to the 
Tribunal  in  Canada  or  the  equivalent  elsewhere  to  determine  whether  dumping 
caused genuine injury. 
Summarizing,  dumping  must  be  the  cause  of  the  material  injury  suffered  by  the 
domestic  industry  in  order  to  proceed  to  implement  anti  dumping  duties,  which 
20 Ibid.
21 The concept of negligible was introduced by the 1979 Anti dumping code. “The negligible injury is to 
be understood as a part of the injurious effect, the later being wider than the former. Indeed, nowhere 
in the new Code is it argued that the injury is either negligible or material. (…) if the injury caused by 
dumping is obviously negligible, then the investigation should be terminated. If the injury caused by 
dumping is not obviously negligible and there is material injury overall (due also to causes other than 
dumping)  then  the  investigating  authority  should  proceed to  a  further  examination  of  causation”. 
Angelos PANGRATIS and Edwin VERMULST, Injury in Anti-Dumping procedures
should not be greater than the margin of dumping. The difficulty of this proof relies in 
an inexistent standard methodology or sometimes well-defined concepts that do not 
give room for confusion or inaccuracy. 
CASE SUMMARY 
The claim that structural tubing was being dumped in the Canadian industry and that 
was causing injury was presented for  the first  time to the Canadian International 
Trade Tribunal  (the Tribunal)  in  2003.  The Tribunal  opened an inquiry  under  the 
provisions of section 42 of the Special  Import Measures Act22 (SIMA), to determine 
whether the dumping of structural tubing caused injury to the domestic industry.
The data collected by the Tribunal in this case covered a three-and-a-half-year period 
from  January 2000  to  June  2003. The  following  is  a  description  of  the  evidence 
presented to the Tribunal and of the results that were reached at the time.
“For the purposes of the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA’s) investigation, 
the  subject  goods  were  defined  as  "structural  tubing  known  as  hollow  structural 
sections (HSS)23. The Commissioner's dumping investigation covered imports of certain 
HSS originating in or exported from the three subject countries that were released 
into  Canada  during  the  period  of  investigation  from  April  1,  2002,  to  March  31, 
2003”24. 
The product subject to investigation by the mentioned inquiry is structural tubing. 
The HSS can be made of carbon and alloy steel, welded, in sizes up to and including 
22 The Canadian legislation that deals with subjects such as dumping. 
23 From now on “the subject goods”
24 See CERTAIN STRUCTURAL TUBING ORIGINATING IN OR EXPORTED FROM THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY. Inquiry No. NQ-2003-001
16.0 inches (406.4 mm) in outside diameter (O.D.) for round products and up to and 
including  48.0  inches  [(1,219.2  mm)]  in  periphery  for  rectangular  and  square 
products,  commonly  but  not  exclusively  made  to  ASTM  A500,  ASTM  A513,  CSA 
G.40.21-87-50W and similar specifications25.
The goods are used in general construction for structural elements in buildings and 
bridges, as protective structures on heavy equipment and for other purposes such as 
highway railings and barriers and outdoor lighting. The goods may also be applied to 
non-structural  uses  in  manufactured  products,  such  as  agricultural  implements, 
trailers and racking and storage systems. The HSS are not used for such things as 
automotive tubing.26
The domestic producers presented that the subject goods produced material injury to 
the domestic industry throughout the period of inquiry (April 2002 – March 2003) and 
that they also threatened to cause material injury. “They argued that the subject 
goods were imported into Canada in large volumes and at low prices and that they 
were the direct cause of injury to the domestic industry that began in the last quarter 
of 2002 and escalated in the first quarter of 2003. They noted that the Canadian 
market,  sales by Canadian producers, for HSS declined between the first half  and 
second half  of  2002. However,  during this  period, sales  of  imports  of  the subject 
goods increased from 1,400 tons in the first half of 2002 to 21,200 tons in the second 
half of 2002. In a declining market, imports of the subject goods increased due to 
price  undercutting,  causing  a  considerable  decline  in  the  volume  of  domestic 
shipments”27.
Barloworld  one  of  the  only  three  foreign  producers  that  answered  the  Tribunal’s 
questions,  argued  that  imports  of  the  subject  goods  from  South  Africa  have  not 
caused injury to the domestic  industry.  “Barloworld  stated that 50 percent of its 
exports to Canada were ASTM A500 grade A, a grade of HSS that is not offered by the 
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. Italic phrase is out of the quote.
domestic industry. It alleged that grade A is a lighter gauge than both grade C and 
CSA grade 350W and is, therefore, less expensive.”28This is relevant because, if their 
production costs of making ASTM A500 grade A were lower than producing grade C, 
then it  would mean that Barloworld  is  not  selling  below cost (which is  a form of 
dumping already mentioned); therefore, it would not be dumping. 
Barloworld also argued that these goods were shipped to Canada from South Africa on 
a regular  schedule and were not substitutable for Canadian products nor did they 
compete with them, mainly because the specifications for each grade (A, B or C) and 
the  market  applications  are  different  in  general.    However,  Barloworld  did  not 
provide any evidence concerning the particular specifications of the grade A goods 
that it shipped to Canada, nor did it specify what market applications its product 
supplied.  Given  that,  Barloworld  defense  was  weak  as  it  tried  to  prove  that  its 
product (ASTM 500 grade A) was not like goods with the tubes in Canada but it never 
provided enough evidence to prove it. 
The Tribunal found that domestically produced HSS, of the same description as the 
subject goods, constitutes like goods to the subject goods. Additionally, the evidence 
indicated that, during the period of investigation, the subject goods from South Africa 
competed directly with the subject goods from the other subject countries at specific 
accounts, as well as with the like goods. The Tribunal found this result because it 
could  establish  the  fungibility  of  the  subject  goods.   According  to  the  Merriam-
Webster Dictionary29, fungible, as an adjective, means “being of such a nature that 
one  part  or  quantity  may  be  replaced  by  another  equal  part  or  quantity  in  the 
satisfaction of an obligation”, it also means “interchangeable”. The Tribunal noted 
that  if  subject  goods  are  fungible  will  compete with  each  other  in  the domestic 
market,  without  considerable  distinction.  Nonetheless,  differences  in  the  physical 
characteristics of the subject goods from one subject country may differentiate them 
28 Ibid. 
29 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fungible
from the other subject  goods in  the way in which they compete in the domestic 
market.
As it was mentioned before, Barloworld argued that the goods that it exported from 
South Africa, ASTM 500 grade A, were different in composition and served to different 
market  applications  than  the  other  grades  that  are  predominantly  sold  by  the 
domestic producers  and the other subject  countries.  However,  Barloworld  did not 
provide the evidence to sustain its arguments and the Tribunal found that the HSS 
produced  domestically  competed  directly  with  the  subject  goods.  Barloworld’s 
products, closely  resembled and is  "like goods"  to domestic HSS. “Over 80% of all 
respondents to the Tribunal's questionnaires on market characteristics reported that 
domestic goods and the subject goods were fully physically interchangeable”. Also, 
the evidence did not show that the subject goods from South Africa did not closely 
look a lot like the subject goods from Korea and Turkey30. 
Even  more,  specific  evidence  from  purchasers  of  HSS  in  Canada  indicated  no 
differences  between  the  subject  goods.  In  addition,  the  evidence  showed  that 
domestic producers were capable of producing grade A, Barloworld’s main product in 
Canada, if there was a demand for it.
It should be noted that the subject goods from South Africa and Turkey were not 
present in the Canadian market in 2000 and 2001, while imports from Korea were 
present  only  in  small  volumes.  Throughout  this  period,  the  Canadian  industry 
operated at profitable levels. The Canadian industry was also profitably in 2002. In 
effect, 2002 as a whole was the most profitable year for the industry according to the 
three-and-a-half-year (January 2000 to June 2003) data examined by the Tribunal. 
Nonetheless,  as  will  be  discussed  below,  signs  of  severe  difficulties  began  to 
materialize towards the end of the year.
30 See CERTAIN STRUCTURAL TUBING ORIGINATING IN OR EXPORTED FROM THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY. Inquiry No. NQ-2003-001
As mentioned before, 2002 was a turbulent year with significant shifts in costs and 
market forces that affected the industry's performance.  Hot-rolled steel sheet (HR) 
costs  went  up  in  the  first  half  of  the  year.  This  is  issue  is  important  for  the 
development of the cause. Hot-rolled steel sheet is the main component (80%) of HSS. 
If the price of HR increases, an augmentation in selling price of HSS will be produced 
at some point. 
In addition to the increase of hot-rolled steel sheet (HR), HSS prices increased in the 
last 6 months of 2002, and the subject goods came in large volumes, in particular in 
the last quarter of the year. According to the evidence, HSS prices originally rose 
more rapidly  than costs  and, as  a result,  the industry's  margins  expanded and its 
profitability augmented. Additionally, profits increased by robust margins on current 
sales of low-cost inventory that had been accumulated earlier in 2002. This allowed 
the industry to achieve solid profitability for the year. However, the yearly and half-
yearly data during the period of the test hides that, as the effect of the imports 
began to be increasingly felt in the last three months of 2002, the industry started to 
experience  a  setback  in  performance  and  some of  the  major  producers  reported 
negative operating income. 
This  descending  tendency  accelerated  through  the  first  half  of  2003  and,  by  the 
second quarter of 2003, all the major producers were experiencing remarkable losses 
in  net  income.  In  the  case  of  two  producers,  their  performance  deteriorated  so 
drastically that they were not even able to reach positive gross margins.  Altogether, 
in the first half of 2003, the industry lost more than $3 million in operating income in 
contrast with profits of $7,2 million over the first six months of 2002. These losses 
were the direct consequence of declining unit sales values that fell more rapidly than 
costs, thus creating a "cost-price squeeze" on the industry. 
The cost decline formerly mentioned could be explained because after peaking late in 
the  summer  of  2002,  hot-rolled  steel  sheets  (HR)  leveled  off  and  then  began  to 
decline towards the end of the same year which means that by 2003 the price of HR 
should had been on its usual level. 
The predominance of the evidence determines that the importation of the subject 
goods was the central explanation the industry performed so poorly and was incapable 
to obtain the revenues required to regain its costs of doing business, mainly in the 
first half of 2003. For the previous reasons, the Tribunal establishes that the injury 
suffered  by  the  dumping  of  certain  HSS  cause  material  injury  to  the  domestic 
industry.
To sum up, the first half of 2002 was profitable for the industry. By that same period 
the price of hot-rolled steel sheet (HR) which is the main component of HSS went up. 
By the second half of 2002, the subject goods penetrated the Canadian market, during 
a moment where the price of the domestic goods was elevated, possible due to the 
increase  of  HR in  the first  period  of  the year,  among other  factors.  Finally,  the 
presence  of  the  subject  goods  was  felt  in  the  first  half  of  2003  when  national 
producers could not compete with the prices of the subject goods and an important 
overall loss was produced on the national industry.  
MEASUREMENT OF THE INJURY.
The  following  section  will  present  the  two  main  arguments31 presented  by  the 
Tribunal that led to determine material injury. Because of the arguments presented 
hereafter, the implementation of antidumping duties is permitted. 
Effects of the volume of dumped goods
In  this  first  segment,  the  effects  of  the  volume  of  dumped  goods  on  domestic 
production and sales will be examined.
31 See CERTAIN STRUCTURAL TUBING ORIGINATING IN OR EXPORTED FROM THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY. Inquiry No. NQ-2003-001
Period of inquiry: from mid-2002 to mid-2003 
• 43,000 tones of the subject goods entered to Canada during the period 
of the inquiry.
o Imports  of the subject  goods were often in excess  of 3,000 to 
4,000 tons every month. 
o This rate of imports represented, in several months, more than 
20 percent of domestic producers' monthly HSS shipments
o From December 2002 to January 2003 they peaked at a level of 
over  10,000  tons.  This  represented  over  30  percent  of  the 
domestic producers' monthly shipments.
• HSS  imports  from Korea  doubled  in  volume during  the  period  of  the 
inquiry.
• Imports from South Africa and Turkey entered the market for the first 
time and rose to volumes that surpassed those from Korea.
o The  monthly  Statistics  Canada  data  show  a  relatively  close 
correlation between the entrance of the subject goods and the 
diminished shipments  by the producers  in  the 12-month period 
commencing in mid-2002.  
• Their collective market share surged from 1% to 9% 
o The  initial  1%  was  comprised  almost  entirely  of  imports  from 
Korea that supplied Western Canada. 
o The extra market share was gained by the sudden entrance to the 
market of the subject good coming from South Africa and Turkey.
o The Tribunal notes that the 9% of market share held by the three 
subject countries in 2003 correspond to the nine points of market 
share lost by the domestic industry between the first half of 2002 
and the first half of 2003
To conclude this part, the Tribunal found that, over the last year of the period of 
inquiry (mid 2002 to mid 2003), there was a rush in the volume of imports of the 
subject goods. It was palpable that the subject goods competed with the like goods of 
the national producers and caused a significant turn down in domestic production and 
sales.
Effects of dumped goods on prices
In this segment the effect of the volume of dumped goods on domestic prices will be 
analyzed. 
Period of inquiry: from mid-2002 to mid-2003 
• At some point during the second half of 2002, steel service centers were 
faced with the prospect of trying to sell the domestic product at $900 
per ton when competing steel service centers were selling the subject 
goods at $650 per ton.
o Facing  such  underpricing  the  industry  had  little  choice  but  to 
lower its prices.
• As domestic mills lowered their prices, the prices of the subject goods 
fell even more
o The  average  unit  selling  prices  of  the  subject  imports  in  the 
second half of 2002 was $675 per ton. 
o In the first half of 2003 the average price fell 9% or $56 per ton, 
to  $619 per ton
• The evidence indicates that prices would not have declined as steeply 
and rapidly as they did, if it was not for the dumped subject goods
o In about six to eight months, domestic mill  prices declined, on 
average, by over 10%, or $100 per ton. In some particular cases, 
the price declined 20% on average
It was evident that despite the frequent price reductions the domestic mills made 
over the period, the ongoing spreads presented continuing competitive difficulties for 
its members. 
In  the  Tribunal's  opinion,  the  low  prices  of  the  subject  goods  undercut  and 
destabilized prices in the market. The Tribunal also found that price is the key driving 
factor behind the rush in imports from the three subject countries.
COUNTER ARGUMENTS
The past section presented the arguments given by the Canadian International Trade 
Tribunal to justify the implementation of anti dumping duties. These arguments led to 
the conclusion that dumped imports of the subject goods were the cause of genuine 
(“material”) injury to the domestic industry. Therefore, it was allowed by the law to 
take measures to offset the injury. 
This section of counter arguments starts by assuming that the practice of dumping 
took  place.  However,  clarifications  and  possible  explanations  for  the  arguments 
provided by the Tribunal will  be presented in order to prove that in spite of the 
occurrence of dumping, the injury suffered by the domestic industry was not caused 
by it. Therefore, antidumping measures were not in order. 
Increase in the price of the hot-rolled steel sheets 
HSS prices are extremely responsive to changes in the price of hot-rolled steel sheet 
(HR). This   happens because, usually, about 80% of the production cost of HSS is 
consisted of the cost of the HR that goes into the production of HSS.  Consequently, 
HSS prices will usually tend to rise and fall in relation to movements in the price of 
HR.
In the course of the first half of 2002, HR prices in Canada augmented sharply and 
quickly. As said by one witness during the audience32, HR prices continued to rise in 
the second half  of  2002, peaking late that summer,  before leveling  off  and then 
starting to decline towards the end of the year. This tendency is seen in the following 
figure.
Figure 1
Hot-rolled steel sheet prices
Industry price indexes (index, 1997=100)
Primary metal products and metal fabricating products
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM table 329-0044
32 Inquiry No. NQ-2003-001
As it can be seen in figure 1, since the first trimester of 2000 the price trend was 
downward but during 2001 it remained stable with little fluctuations. Finally, it can 
be appreciated that, as mentioned before, throughout the first half of 2002, HR prices 
augmented significantly but by the end of 2002 to the first half of 2003, HR prices 
started to fall  and this could have also caused some analogous decrease in prices 
since, as argued previously, HR and HSS prices follow each other, subject to time lags
Figure 2 makes evident the variation of the price tendency in the period of enquiry 
(January 2000 to June 2003) and clearly demonstrates how the significant increase on 
the price of HR occurred during the first three quarters of 2002.   
Figure 2
Percentage variation in the price of HR 
Industry price indexes (index, 1997=100)
Primary metal products and metal fabricating products
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM table 329-0044
As mentioned earlier, the sharp rise in HR prices that began in the first six months of 
2002 consistently worked its way into a correspondingly sharp increase in HSS prices. 
Specifically, from the first six months to the second six months of 2002, the average 
unit value of domestic sales increased from $702 to $867 per ton, an augmentation of 
almost 25%. The price levels attained by the domestic industry in the second half of 
2002 correspond to the highest levels  reported by the industry over the Tribunal's 
three-and-a-half year (January 2000 to June 2003) period of investigation.  
Nonetheless, the velocity and extent of the HR and related HSS price increases in 
North America were not equaled in other places of the world. In Europe or Asia, HR 
prices did not rise as they did in North America during the concerned period. As a 
result, during 2002, a growing spread started to develop between HR/HSS prices in 
North America and those in Europe and Asia. On the word of a number of witnesses, 
the increasing HSS prices  in  Canada and the rising spreads between the domestic 
prices and those existing in other places of the world made some Canadian buyers of 
HSS to start seeking sources of supply overseas.  
This leads us to the conclusion that even in the absence of dumped imports, the sales 
by  domestic  firms  would  have  fallen  anyway  because  of  the  increment  in  their 
production costs. 
Market Participation of Imports
Figure 3 shows the participation in the market of pipes, tubes, iron and steel imports 
of different countries. Data is given in thousands of dollars33.
Figure 3
Market participation of imports by country
33 For more information see the Annex. 
Source: CANSIM - Imports, by summary import groups (SIG) and other aggregations, by countries or 
areas of origin, customs basis not seasonally adjusted, monthly (dollars) (data in thousands) - Table 
226-0002
Figure 4
Market Participation of South Africa
Source: CANSIM. Table 226-0002
On one hand, figure 3 clearly illustrates how the United States has the biggest share 
with approximately 65%. The European Union also has a notorious position with almost 
11%  of  the  market  which  means  that  basically  these  two  players  are  the  main 
competitors for the local producer. On the other hand, South Africa is not a main 
player as the same graphic noticeably states. Figure 4 corroborates how its market 
participation is less than 1% and with such a low portion changes in imports coming 
from this country are not likely to affect the market in general. 
In  figure 5 it  is  clearly  shown how imports  of  the subject  goods  visibly increased 
during the inquiry period. However, was this increment important enough to affect 
the industry? As it was mentioned before, most likely it was not because of the small 
fraction  South  Africa  has  of  the  Canadian  market.  Therefore,  it  is  important  to 
analyze the behavior of the other participants which have more relevance because of 
the volume they trade, as well as the contribution of South African imports.
Figure 5
Imports from South Africa trend. 
Data in thousands of dollars.
Source: CANSIM - Imports, by summary import groups (SIG) and other aggregations, by countries or 
areas of origin, customs basis not seasonally adjusted, monthly (dollars) (data in thousands) - Table 
226-0002
Even though imports from other countries did not augment in the same percentage as 
imports from South Africa during the concerned period, they also increased. Rise that 
was  more significant  because  Other  Countries’  imports  represent  a  larger  volume 
(almost 20% of the market) and their increase was produced for a longer period of 
time. 
The former argument is reaffirmed by figure 6. It illustrates how while from October 
to  December  2002  there  was  a  general  fall  in  imports  of  almost  23%  (from 
$110.000.000  to  $85.000.000  approximately)  or  $25.000.000  in  absolute  values, 
imports from South Africa grew as shown in figure 5. However, the large increase of 
52% of  South  African  imports  corresponds  to  $769.00034.  The later  amount  is  not 
representative enough to be claimed as injurious for this specific industry given the 
volume it trades. 
Figure 6
Imports from all the participant countries in the market excluding South Africa 
Data in thousands of dollars.
Source: CANSIM - Table 226-0002
34 For more information see the Annex.
 One partial conclusion can be made at this point: It has been proven and reinforced 
that the subject imports are not sufficiently large to produce genuine injury to the 
Canadian market.  
Further on, it will be analyzed if dumped imports from South Africa had a negative 
impact on sales. This analysis is important to determine whether the subject imports 
caused material injury to the industry.
Figure 7 demonstrates a negative correlation between the variation of imports from 
United  States  and  from  other  countries  and  from  South  Africa.  Therefore,  when 
imports  from US decreased during July 2002 to January 2003, imports  from South 
Africa augmented capturing 1% to 2.6%35 of the total market.  However, imports from 
all the countries augmented as well during the mentioned period capturing up to 30%36 
of the market which corresponds to a increment of 5% because the usual market share 
of other countries fluctuates around 25%. Imports from the EU also rose capturing 14% 
which represents an increase of 4% approximately. 
Figure 7
Imports by origin.
Data in percentage.
35 See Annex
36 Ibid. 
Source: CANSIM - Imports, by summary import groups (SIG) and other aggregations, by countries or 
areas of origin, customs basis not seasonally adjusted, monthly (dollars) (data in thousands) - Table 
226-0002
The last mentioned increments in absolute values were more significant and could 
have certainly produced a more harmful effect for the industry due to the bigger 
market participation held by the mentioned players.
Finally, sales effectively suffered a reduction throughout the first months of 2003 but 
as  figure 8  clearly  demonstrates  it  was  not  during the same period  that  dumped 
imports from South Africa penetrated the Canadian market in a relative large volume. 
Moreover,  during the sales reduction in 2003, imports of subject goods where not 
present in the market appreciably but imports from other countries augmented during 
period in question. 
Figure 8
Sales
Data in thousands of dollars.
Source: CANSIM - Table 226-0002
Briefly, the fall in sales of HSS did not correspond to the period of dumping from the 
subject country. On the contrary, it corresponded to a phase of increase in imports 
coming from other countries. This fact that could have had a more profound negative 
effect on the industry because of the larger volume represented by imports from the 
alternative  suppliers.  Moreover,  as  it  was  shown  in  several  different  figures,  the 
market contribution of subject goods is so little that it could not effectively cause an 
injury to the industry in spite of dumping. 
WELFARE DISCUSSION 
This section presents a discussion on the implementation of antidumping (AD) duties. 
Economic results view will be presented in order to analyze whether the AD duties are 
to the detriment of welfare.
Different  authors  have studied  the  effect  on  social  welfare  of  third-degree  price 
discrimination.   Richard  Schmalensee’s  (198137)  most  important  result  defines  an 
increase in output as a necessary (even though not sufficient)  condition for social 
welfare38 increase. His results also show that, in general, when price discrimination 
(PD) is allowed, both, output and welfare may increase or decrease. The net gain thus 
can be positive only if total output expands, in other words, only if the increase in 
sales to the weak market  exceeds the drop in sales to the strong market
. Therefore,  unless output  increases,  monopolistic  third  degree  PD 
generates a net efficiency loss.  
Varian (1985)39 supports Schmalensee’s results and adds that in the case of one good 
sold  in  n  different  markets  and  produced  at  constant  marginal  cost,  when  the 
profitability of the new output exceeds the profitability of the old output, valued at 
the  new prices,  then  welfare  must  have  risen  at  the  discriminatory  equilibrium. 
Varian’s argument is basically a revealed preference relationship.
In  our  case  is  difficult  to  prove lessen  in  aggregate  output  because  only  imports 
(which are the main concern of this paper) were analyzed. However, the arguments 
provided by Schmalensee and Varian show how price discrimination  under  certain 
conditions  can actually  be welfare improving which leads us to conclude that the 
implementation of AD duties instead of preventing negative effects can actually cause 
them.
CONCLUSION
37 Richard Schmalensee, Output and welfare implications of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination, 
American Economic Review. http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/1956/SWP-1095-15503913.pdf?
sequence=1
38 Social welfare considered as consumers’ plus producers’ surplus. 
39 Hal R Varian, Price discrimination and social welfare,  The American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 4 (Sep., 
1985), pp. 870-875. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1821366.pdf?acceptTC=true
Hollow structural sections (HSS) are an essential product for the construction industry 
due to their multiple uses. From bridges to highway railings, HSS may also be applied 
to non-structural uses in manufactured products, such as agricultural implements.
During the period of inquiry the Canadian industry of HSS suffered significant losses. 
By the same period, similar  goods coming from countries such as the  Republic of 
Korea,  South  Africa  and Turkey penetrated the market  in  what was  called  “large 
volume”.  Both  facts drove  the  national  producers  of  HSS  to  accuse  the  entrant 
merchandise to be the cause of their losses. According to the national producers, the 
mentioned countries were dumping the products which were selling at very low prices 
making the competition unsustainable for local mills. 
The Canadian International Trade Tribunal fund that the subject goods were actually 
being dumped into Canada and most importantly for this paper, the Tribunal fund 
that the dumped goods were the cause of the injury suffered by the industry during 
the period of April 2002, to March 2003. The Tribunal also stated that the low prices 
of the subject goods undercut and destabilized prices in the market. 
Throughout this paper mainly the role of South Africa was taken into account and 
several reasons were presented to prove that other situations influenced the market 
in order to provoke a worsening in its levels.  This means that even if dumping took 
place, it was not the main cause of the injury suffered by the Canadian industry of 
HSS. 
The continuous increment in the price of hot-rolled steel sheet (HR) which is the main 
component of HSS and which has a positive correlation with its price provoked an 
increment in the price of locally produced HSS. The velocity and extent of the HR and 
related HSS price increases in North America were not equaled in other markets of 
the world. In Europe or Asia, HR prices did not rise as they did in North America 
during the concerned period. This put Canadian mills in disadvantage compared with 
imports of HSS not only coming from the subject countries but from any other country 
producing HSS. 
Moreover, it was demonstrated how the market participation of imports from South 
Africa was too small to affect the overall Canadian market. United States and the 
European Union have a participation of almost 65% which gives them a preponderant 
position  and  makes  them  the  main  competitors  of  the  local  mills.  Besides,  an 
intensive analysis showed how the reduction in sales of HSS did not match the period 
of entrance of dumped imports coming from South Africa. It is clear that even in the 
absence of dumped imports, domestic mills’ sales would have fallen because of the 
increase in their production costs.  
In spite of the increase in the volume of imports of the subject goods, we can deduce 
from the market portion of South African sales that the volume of the imports was 
neither big nor important enough to cause a sensitive impact on the industry. So, 
even if the spread between domestic prices and import’s prices was wide, the local 
demand was not satisfy by the low-price-imports. Therefore, dumped imports were 
not the cause of the injury of the Canadian industry during the period of concern.
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ANNEX
IMPORTS
 
South 
Africa
%of 
Total EU
%of 
Total USA
%of 
Total
Other 
Countrie
s
%of 
Total Totals
Jan-00 203 0.19% 11,767 11% 75,183 71% 18,168 17% 105,321
Feb-00 181 0.16% 7,943 7% 82,280 73% 22,638 20% 113,042
Mar-00 76 0.06% 13,467 11% 80,222 64% 31,856 25% 125,621
Apr-00 1,119 1.09% 10,543 10% 66,201 64% 24,976 24% 102,839
May-00 213 0.18% 9,917 8% 68,919 57% 41,542 34% 120,591
Jun-00 535 0.52% 11,744 11% 66,884 65% 23,386 23% 102,549
Jul-00 69 0.07% 9,637 10% 55,829 60% 27,516 30% 93,051
Aug-00 208 0.18% 7,344 6% 81,415 69% 29,164 25% 118,131
Sep-00 2 0.00% 6,318 6% 69,681 68% 25,911 25% 101,912
Oct-00 329 0.26% 9,539 8% 71,508 57% 43,519 35% 124,895
Nov-00 547 0.45% 12,805 10% 74,965 61% 33,827 28% 122,144
Dec-00 603 0.59% 10,833 11% 65,160 64% 25,049 25% 101,645
Jan-01 905 0.68% 12,637 10% 77,634 58% 41,836 31% 133,012
Feb-01 101 0.09% 9,387 9% 70,954 65% 28,311 26% 108,753
Mar-01 215 0.20% 10,188 9% 75,589 69% 23,483 21% 109,475
Apr-01 118 0.12% 10,219 11% 65,138 67% 21,688 22% 97,163
May-01 2 0.00% 8,262 9% 64,889 70% 19,254 21% 92,407
Jun-01 0 0.00% 10,042 10% 70,146 68% 22,811 22% 102,999
Jul-01 344 0.35% 14,457 15% 58,392 60% 24,506 25% 97,699
Aug-01 169 0.15% 12,331 11% 70,443 62% 30,318 27% 113,261
Sep-01 13 0.01% 11,170 11% 67,925 64% 26,815 25% 105,923
Oct-01 193 0.17% 12,917 11% 69,226 59% 34,560 30% 116,896
Nov-01 285 0.25% 14,096 12% 62,899 55% 37,735 33% 115,015
Dec-01 532 0.55% 10,727 11% 71,971 74% 14,249 15% 97,479
Jan-02 98 0.09% 14,117 12% 63,600 56% 36,532 32% 114,347
Feb-02 253 0.28% 9,586 10% 62,801 69% 18,747 21% 91,387
Mar-02 170 0.17% 9,529 10% 62,549 64% 25,623 26% 97,871
Apr-02 240 0.24% 14,744 15% 59,647 60% 24,769 25% 99,400
May-02 354 0.35% 9,083 9% 65,483 64% 26,698 26% 101,618
Jun-02 168 0.18% 11,459 12% 61,433 66% 20,255 22% 93,315
Jul-02 1,111 1.21% 10,843 12% 57,126 62% 22,752 25% 91,832
Aug-02 103 0.10% 13,088 13% 59,901 61% 25,718 26% 98,810
Sep-02 653 0.70% 10,040 11% 57,748 62% 25,125 27% 93,566
Oct-02 1,475 1.33% 8,102 7% 67,290 61% 33,772 31% 110,639
Nov-02 1,188 1.26% 13,092 14% 55,084 59% 24,751 26% 94,115
Dec-02 2,244 2.60% 10,594 12% 50,700 59% 22,862 26% 86,400
Jan-03 987 0.88% 12,720 11% 66,458 59% 32,204 29% 112,369
Feb-03 70 0.08% 9,575 11% 60,630 67% 20,722 23% 90,997
Mar-03 242 0.21% 9,418 8% 65,468 58% 38,287 34% 113,415
Apr-03 67 0.06% 15,650 14% 60,713 55% 33,824 31% 110,254
May-03 389 0.39% 18,081 18% 52,834 54% 27,294 28% 98,598
Jun-03 220 0.22% 12,786 13% 52,166 53% 32,798 33% 97,970
Jul-03 314 0.38% 13,563 16% 53,804 64% 15,890 19% 83,571
Total
17,30
8 0.38%
484,36
0 11%
2,818,8
88 63%
1,181,7
41 26%
4,502,29
7
SALES
 
South 
Africa
Other 
Countrie
s Total
Total 
Sales
Jan-00 203 105,118 105,321 223,355
Feb-00 181 112,861 113,042 235,973
Mar-00 76 125,545 125,621 264,275
Apr-00 1,119 101,720 102,839 220,206
May-00 213 120,378 120,591 249,263
Jun-00 535 102,014 102,549 259,816
Jul-00 69 92,982 93,051 191,712
Aug-00 208 117,923 118,131 228,641
Sep-00 2 101,910 101,912 217,599
Oct-00 329 124,566 124,895 253,227
Nov-00 547 121,597 122,144 253,427
Dec-00 603 101,042 101,645 212,013
Jan-01 905 132,107 133,012 241,301
Feb-01 101 108,652 108,753 231,391
Mar-01 215 109,260 109,475 253,703
Apr-01 118 97,045 97,163 204,038
May-01 2 92,405 92,407 233,113
Jun-01 0 102,999 102,999 243,363
Jul-01 344 97,355 97,699 199,885
Aug-01 169 113,092 113,261 259,622
Sep-01 13 105,910 105,923 239,766
Oct-01 193 116,703 116,896 251,592
Nov-01 285 114,730 115,015 224,069
Dec-01 532 96,947 97,479 184,948
Jan-02 98 114,249 114,347 241,294
Feb-02 253 91,134 91,387 220,913
Mar-02 170 97,701 97,871 220,428
Apr-02 240 99,160 99,400 212,853
May-02 354 101,264 101,618 232,460
Jun-02 168 93,147 93,315 233,847
Jul-02 1,111 90,721 91,832 224,073
Aug-02 103 98,707 98,810 244,219
Sep-02 653 92,913 93,566 234,557
Oct-02 1,475 109,164 110,639 248,550
Nov-02 1,188 92,927 94,115 262,207
Dec-02 2,244 84,156 86,400 238,615
Jan-03 987 111,382 112,369 282,095
Feb-03 70 90,927 90,997 269,879
Mar-03 242 113,173 113,415 281,887
Apr-03 67 110,187 110,254 222,173
May-03 389 98,209 98,598 242,545
Jun-03 220 97,750 97,970 244,601
Jul-03 314 83,257 83,571 237,028
Total 17,308
4,484,98
9
4,502,2
97
10,170,5
22
